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This study employs a wider livelihoods approach to challenge some insular neo-classical 
economic narratives on the nature, process and impact of large-scale land acquisitions on 
smallholder farmers living on Africa’s customary land. Large-scale land-based acquisitions are 
often justified as a vehicle to utilise idle land, improve land productivity, modernise the 
countryside, commercialise the agrarian sector, create jobs and ensure macro-economic returns, 
while conversely portraying smallholder land-based livelihoods as pristine, unproductive, unable 
to support national development and enhance poverty reduction. This approach is problematic, 
since the diverse land uses by smallholder farmers are narrowly examined, the production and 
poverty reduction value to rural livelihoods is largely ignored and the social implications, 
psychological ramifications and economic benefits of the large-scale capitalist ventures are not 
explored in-depth. Even the process of land acquisition is hardly regulated by an array of 
international, regional and national guidelines on responsible investments. This is because of the 
intersection of the state, traditional leaders and private sector interests staked against the 
smallholder farmers in coercive hierarchical relationships. Of course, investors create some jobs 
with some differential benefits but these are often seasonal and too precarious to augment 
sustainable alternative livelihoods. This article therefore provides rich empirical data from 
Zambia’s newly-created Chembe district to demonstrate the limitations of the romanticised neo-
classical economic benefits and the need for a wider livelihoods lens. From such a wider 
perspective, we challenge the notion of an agrarian trajectory based on a capitalist transition to 
large-scale farms and co-existence premised on voluntary regulation in the context of weak 
governance and unequal power relations, thus opting for an alternative path hinged on securing 
livelihoods for the rural smallholder farmers. 
 
 











AU  African Union 
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FPIC  Free Prior Informed Consent 
FRA  Food Reserve Agency 
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INTRODUCTION 
How have foreign-based investments affected land-based livelihoods for smallholder farmers in 
Africa? This article seeks to shift debate from an insular macro-economic perspective to a more 
diverse livelihoods approach, one that is informed by the day-to-day quotidian concerns of the 
rural smallholder farmers. The article is informed by a qualitative case study of Mansa Sugar 
Limited, an Indian-owned company, which acquired 5 000 hectares of state and customary land 
in Zambia’s newly-created Chembe district. The land was acquired for irrigated sugar-cane 
production in order to produce   sugar, ethanol and electricity. Hall (2011) and Scoones (2016) 
long observed the sugar rush in Southern Africa. We challenge the assumptions that there are 
vast tracts of vacant and unproductive land readily available for investors in marginalised rural 
Africa, that smallholder farmers are mere substantivists, that investor-promised multiple and 
inclusive macro-economic benefits and modernisation projects for the rural sector are a given. 
In addition, we assert that regulation of investments is more in theory than practice as power 
relations are heavily skewed in favour of big capital, some state elites and traditional leaders in 
the context of weak governance. We acknowledge that some jobs are created with differential 
benefits and some benefits are derived from social corporate responsibility but they are not 
meaningful enough to support sustainable livelihoods. Consequently, the investments have 
negatively affected the diverse and multiple land-based livelihoods for the rural farmers 
including loss of financial income, food, good health and education.  Hence the need for an 
alternative path to development in contrast to the ahistorical envisioned capitalist transition to 
large-scale estates. To substantiate our argument, we present this article in seven interrelated 
parts. First, we give our theoretical approach and justification for the article. Second, we unpack 
the agrarian investments in Chembe, analysing the pull factors in line with the state’s pro-
market policies. Third, we detail the qualitative methodology and why it is of use in capturing 
local livelihoods. Fourth, we explore whether the land was vacant and unproductive, how the 
land was acquired in the context of Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), then broaden to look at 
wider livelihoods lost beyond land and land rights. Fifth, we analyse whether the forms of 
compensation covered wider livelihoods in line with regional and international guidelines for 
responsible investments. The sixth section motivates for an alternative path before concluding 
in the last section. In the next section we elaborate on our theoretical perspective. 
 
We chose to adopt a wider livelihoods perspective with its genealogy in Cousins and Scoones 
(2010)’s debate on how the framing of agriculture and land reform influence state policies in 
Southern Africa. We were convinced that large-scale land deals in Africa must be understood in 
terms of the livelihoods interest of the smallholder farmers that are complex and anchored on 
land as the main form of natural capital. The emphasis is on understanding the impact of land 
deals in the context of diverse and multiple livelihoods with access to land being central to other 
forms of capital such as human, social, physical, and financial for poverty reduction (Scoones 
2009). This is a better illuminating lens that goes beyond analysing land deals through an insular 
focus on efficiency in economic returns to land, labour and capital premised on scale (Cousins 
and Scoones 2010). We were aware of the limitations of this approach in its neglect of power 
and gender relations in Africa’s differentiated society (Murray 2002).  
1 
We therefore tried to integrate these in our analysis without claiming to be exhaustive. We 
factor the gendered impact of the investments noting that it is typically unequal between men 
and women. Informed by such a wider livelihoods perspective we argue that policy formulation 
in relation to land grabs must focus on poverty reduction for the rural farmers. We find de 
                                                             
1I would like to acknowledge the partnership and co-fieldwork with Zambia Land Alliance. However, the analysis and views 
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Schutter’s (2011) trifocal approach useful in framing such a future.  First, is the transition path.  
This envisions industrial farming as the future and reflects the modernisation narratives of the 
colonial era. To some, de-peasantisation will happen. Small-scale farming is not considered as an 
alternative (de Schutter 2011). The second is the co-existence path. This refers to the possibility 
of achieving both the establishment of large-scale plantations and protecting the smallholder 
farmers. It is under this model that regulations are considered key. The third is what we coin as 
the alternative path. It builds from de Schutter’s formulation that it is a scenario,  
 
in which governments seek to channel agricultural investment into the support of small-scale 
farming. This, it should be emphasized, is not equivalent to the status quo, or to preserving 
subsistence agriculture—with low productivity, and few possibilities for the farmer to climb his 
or her way out of poverty. Nor is it a way of saying that investments in agriculture, and 
particularly the arrival of foreign investors, should be shunned: rather, it is a way of ensuring that 
investment will be directed towards ends that are most poverty-reducing (de Schutter 2011: 
261). 
 
The interventions must go beyond a narrow ahistorical conceptualisation of a teleological 
capitalist transition to large-scale farms in the countryside leading to de-peasantisation. The 
latter means ‘the loss or disappearance of the peasantry’ through loss of their access to means of 
production (van der Ploeg 2013). A proposition for co-existence is based on regulation is 
possible but difficult given weak governance and the unequal power relations. State elites, chiefs 
and investors involved in land deals have juridical, economic and social power. A wider 
livelihoods approach would require a form of de Schutter’s alternative path framework hinged 
on investments that support smallholder production for poverty reduction. Of course, as Cousins 
and Scoones (2010) have argued, contradictions will always be there between an emphasis on 
poverty alleviation for the poor and need for economic growth for poverty reduction.  
 
Be that as it may, this article is important in regenerating academic debate on land deals beyond 
the narrow acceptance of large capitalist estates as the only vehicle for emancipation of rural 
livelihoods. It adds to a growing body of case studies focusing on the implications of land deals 
for local livelihoods in Africa. Furthermore, it brings out rich empirics, something that will be 
hard to unearth by expanding the breadth of the study within the same study timeline. Of course, 
this makes it difficult to generalise. However, it is through systematic collection of empirically 
rich case studies that meaningful comparisons can be done to build a national and regional 
picture on the revolving impact of large-scale land deals on rural livelihoods. In addition, the 
study is also relevant in feeding into ongoing debates about investment policies and Africa’s 
agrarian future. Solid answers continue to be elusive for activists, scholars and policy makers 
alike. Our hope too is that it will provide a key foundational resource for students and scholars 
that want to pursue further studies in understanding the livelihoods realities of smallholder 
farmers in the context of land deals and perhaps their differentiated nature in the long term. We 
now turn to the dynamics of agrarian investments in Chembe.    
 
AGRO-BASED INVESTMENTS IN CHEMBE DISTRICT  
While global policies matter, host public policies are also significant in fostering investments 
(Cotula 2012). Chembe district managed to attract foreign investors due to both external and 
internal factors. Some scholars usually focus on the external factors that led to a new rush for 
Africa’s land namely the triple financial, food and fuel crises in 2009 and downplay the internal 
factors such as public policy and the investor’s internal logic of capitalist accumulation. For 
substantiation, the Zambian government set up a Multiple Facility Economic Zone in Chembe 
district in 2009 (MFEZ). MFEZ is a designated zone meant to attract domestic and foreign direct 
investments. The intention was to ‘create the ideal investment environment for attracting major 
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of the Japanese and Chinese governments.  Under this model the Zambian government acquires 
customary land, converts it into state land and creates infrastructure for industry that attracts 
investors. The Chembe MFEZ zone was about 3 600 hectares. It is evident that Zambia’s market-
based land tenure reforms embodied in the 1995 Land Act in the era of neo-liberal policies 
legalised the conversion of customary land into state land which could be sold, thus theoretically 
placing the countryside on the market for foreign and domestic investors. Prior to 1995, only six 
percent of the land could be traded (Nolte 2013). The rest was under customary tenure and 
could not be converted. With the rise in demand for land from 2008 some studies show that 
customary land has diminished from 94 % to 54% in 2015 (Sitko et al 2015). Once the land is 
converted to state land it cannot be reversed. 
 
According to Chembe’s Council Secretary there were also financial incentives for investors. For 
Zambia and thus Chembe district, an investment of at least US$500 000 attracted no tax on 
profits for five years from the first year of operation of manufacturing projects (ZDA 2018). 
Second, there was no tax on dividends for five years from the first year of declaration of 
dividends (ZDA 2018). Third, there was no import duty on capital goods and machinery 
including specialised motor vehicles for five years (ZDA 2018). Fourth, value added tax 
incentives include zero rates on mining products for export (ZDA 2018). There were also non-
direct fiscal incentives, such as free access to health services by investor’s skilled personnel, help 
in getting immigration permits, protection against nationalism and support in acquiring land. 
The government was typically subsidising large-scale agriculture. As de Schutter has argued, ‘a 
first obstacle is that poor agriculture-based countries who seek to attract foreign capital in order 
to develop their infrastructures are competing for the arrival of direct investment. This results in 
a tendency to lower the level of requirements imposed on investors, whether these relate to the 
compensations owed, to the creation of employment, or to the payment of taxes’ (de Schutter 
2011: 264…). The General Manager at Mansa Sugar acknowledged the support in our interview. 
He said, ‘no doubt Zambia is a good place. Government is helping us. The chiefs are very helpful. 
If any problem comes they help us. Land Alliance also helps us. They are innocent people. Local 
communities are always innocent people’.2 The innocence could refer to how they view local 
people as being naïve about the relentless logic of capital investments or mere appreciation of 
good hospitality.  Mulongwe, the district’s crop officer seemed to confirm that government 
rendered significant support to the investor, perhaps at the expense of the smallholder. He 
explained,  
We are the project manager of Mansa Sugar Limited. As a department we have been involved in 
site selection. We assigned the investment site, we counted farmers, and evaluated their fields 
and they were paid. Now Mansa said we must identify people interested in outgrower schemes 
from the community. 3 
The incentives are in fact so numerous that the benefits to the Zambian government are 
impervious. 
 
Geographically, Chembe attracted new investors because of rich natural resources. There was 
plenty of water from the Luapula and Lwela Rivers and various streams in the district. The 
Luapula River covered 152 kilometres in Chembe district.4 In fact, the sugar-cane plantation was 
situated along the river bank. The investors emphasised that water for irrigation was not a 
problem. Mansa Sugar Limited used water for irrigation from the Luapula River. They operated a 
complex pivot system and had a water pump in the Luapula River. This confirms the assertion 
that investors do not only look for land but also water resources (Mehta et al 2012). As White et 
al (2012) have argued in the context of land deals, ‘despite much rhetoric on targeting marginal 
lands, investor interest often focuses on the best land in terms of water availability and 
irrigation potential, soil fertility, proximity to markets or availability of infrastructure 
(2013:37).’ As the senior agricultural officer for Chembe district collaborated, ‘for Chembe 
                                                             
2 Interview, Mansa Sugar General Manager, Chembe, 12 March 2018 
3 Interview, Mulongwe, Agriculture Department Chembe, March 2018 
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district, water is not a problem. The investors are following water resources in Luapula River. 
There are several districts in the province but investors are following the route of Luapula 
River.’5 Chembe received an average of 900mm of rainfall a year and average temperatures of 25 
degrees celsius.6 The climate was suitable for sugar-cane production, cassava, soya, rice, citrus 
fruits and plantations (ZDA 2018). These are some of the crops that investors are interested in. 
The district was situated right at the border of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) which provides diverse export marketing opportunities to Rwanda and Burundi as well. 
An abundance of sunshine was another key natural factor that attracted investors to the new 
district (ZDA 2018).  
 
As a result, the following is a profile of investments taking shape in Chembe. These were collated 
from various interviews with the Council Secretary, the District Commissioner and from primary 
documents. 
 
Table 1: Profile of investments in Chembe District 
Area of Investment Description Stage 
Agri-based  For sugar-cane plantation and 
processing factory  
Mansa Sugar already 
established sugar-cane 
plantations and factory 
under construction  
Mining-based For manganese and iron  No investor yet 
Fish farming  For fish cage farming along 
Lwela River 
Negotiations ongoing with 
Pendulum investors 
Residential plots 1 600 plots for housing Chembe Town Council 
investing  
Energy-based  For solar power plant Negotiations ongoing  
Agri-based  For small-scale chili 
production 
In the initial construction 
phase by a Zambian 
investor 
Agri-based For sugar-cane production 15, 400 hectares of land 
acquired by Chimsoro 
Milling company. No 
activity on the land yet 
 
However, Chembe was not all rosy as an investment destination. The physical capital was poor 
and infrastructure was not good. The rural farmers lived in a long neglected area in terms of 
development. As the District Commissioner explained, ‘Chembe being a new district, our 
infrastructure is poor. In the western part of the district the road is in a deplorable state. In the 
rain season people are cut off. Roads are bad. Housing is a challenge. There are few schools and 
health posts and people walk long distances to seek medication’.7 The council secretary also 
noted that drinking ‘water was a severe challenge’.8 He said the council had a K1 million plan to 
invest in a mini-water scheme in order to supply the new community of investors with clean 
drinking water. 
Given the above investment initiatives, we focused on Mansa Sugar Limited because it was the 
biggest investment in the district. The investment was projected to cost US$50 million upon 
                                                             
5 Interview, Patrick Bwalya, Senior Agricultural Officer, Chembe District, Chembe, 13 March 2018 
6 ibid 
7 Interview, Mumba Mushitu, District Commissioner Chembe, 12 March 2018. Personal observation 




Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies: Working Paper Series 12 Dec 2018 
5 Foreign Investments and Livelihoods in Northern Zambia 
completion.9 As of early 2018, the Managing Director said about US$25 million had been 
injected. In addition, Mansa had acquired land and started investment activities with an impact 
on the livelihoods of small-scale farmers. Further it is owned by Indians signifying a South to 
South investment, a trend long observed by Hall (2011). What had they invested in? Since 
August 2015, Mansa Sugar planted a total of 900 hectares of sugar-cane and aimed to reach 1900 
hectares of land by the end of 2018.10  The General Manager said they wanted ‘to produce sugar, 
ethanol and electricity’.11 This shows the food-fuel-energy nexus. Mr Chisango, the Zambia 
Development Agency General Director was confident of the macro-economic benefits the project 
would bring. He said that, ‘ethanol fuel will go down by 25%, thousands of jobs would be 
created, local businesses’ value chains would be enhanced, outgrower schemes will empower 
local communities, bring in foreign currency and lead to export-oriented industrialisation’ in 
Zambia.12 This was reiterated in our interview with the General Manager of Mansa and most 
government officials.13  
 
Mansa Sugar Limited had also completed a road network in the enclosure covering 25 
kilometres.14 They had drawn electricity from the Zambia Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO) 
power line. There were also investments in irrigation. A South African irrigation manufacturer, 
Agrico was awarded the contract to provide irrigation. A water pump was installed at Luapula 
River and centre pivots installed on planted land.15 The water pump could provide 2 156 cubic 
metres of water at full capacity (Smith 2017). Machinery such as tractors, combine harvesters 
and planters was purchased from South America, India and South Africa. Offices and houses for 
skilled labour were under construction and some had been completed for senior management.16 
A sugar processing factory was at an advanced construction stage to an extent that the investor 
expected to start producing sugar by the end of 2018.17 The sugar processing plant was expected 
to produce half a million tonnes of sugar-cane a year.18 From calculations this would produce 
about 40 000 tonnes of sugar annually. Of interest here is that the infrastructural development is 
happening inside the enclosure. How benefits will trickle to the periphery remains to be seen. 
Now we delve into the research methodology that helped us to see whether the investment was 
helping wider livelihoods. 
 
METHODOLOGY  
Concrete investigations rather than ideological persuasions should inform intellectual debates 
about the effect of large-scale land-based investments on livelihoods in rural Africa. 
Consequently, our study is based on field research. We held interviews in 2018 in Zambia’s 
Chembe district.  We conducted 11 long in-depth interviews with heads of households (five men 
and six women) who lost their land. These interviews enabled the farmers to tell their story in a 
way that captured their wider livelihoods beyond statistics on economic returns to land, labour 
and capital. In addition, we had an open discussion about the investment and its impact with 33 
community members (23 women and 10 men) to verify and triangulate some of the stories.  
From the 33 community members, we managed to have 21 follow-up short detailed interviews 
with farmers who lost their land to the investor. In total, we therefore had 32 detailed in-depth 
interviews with farmers who lost their land out of the affected 310 families. These interviews 
                                                             
9 https://www.znbc.co.zm/50m-mansa-sugar-set-to-open/, 6 February 2018 
10 Interview, Mansa Sugar General Manager, Chembe, 12 March 2018 
11 Interview, Mansa Sugar General Manager, Chembe, 12 March 2018 
12 http://www.zda.org.zm/?q=content/zda-reflects-copperbelt-and-luapula-investment-monitoring-tour 
13 Interview, Mansa Sugar General Manager, Chembe, 12 March 2018 
14 Interview, Mansa Sugar General Manager, Chembe, 12 March 2018 
15 Interview, Mansa Sugar General Manager, Chembe, 12 March 2018 
16 Personal observation, 12 March 2018 
17 Interview, Mansa Sugar General Manager, Chembe, 12 March 2018. Personal observation, Mansa Sugar, 12 March 2018 
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were all recorded on camera. The few media articles on Chembe were also of use as well as 
personal notes from farmers.  
 
Beyond the farmers who lost their land, we interviewed seven government officials. Five were 
from the Department of Agriculture which was central in working with smallholder farmers, 
scoping the land for investment, doing evaluations for compensations, and supporting the 
investor. The other two were the District Commissioner and the Council Secretary for the 
District. They were central in helping the investor with land acquisition on both state and 
customary land. We then had in-depth interviews with two traditional chiefs who ‘gave’ 
customary land to the investor. It was also important for us to hear from one civil society 
representative of the Mansa Land Alliance who promoted pro-poor land rights. This diverse 
range of actors gave us rich detailed material which enabled us to write this story which 
challenges some parochial neo-classical framing of big capital investments as a panacea to 
insecure livelihoods. In the next section we interrogate whether there was available land. 
 
WAS THE LAND VACANT AND UNPRODUCTIVE? 
The headline in the African Farming on 12 June 2017 read, ‘From nothing to a great commercial 
sugar-cane operation in just over two years’ in praise of the Mansa Sugar investment (Smith 
2017). The assumption was that there was nothing productive on the acquired land.  Nan Smith, 
the author of the article, went on to claim that, ‘the bush that covered this land has made way for 
fields of sugar-cane, a year of harvesting in three years’ (Smith 2017). The use of the term ‘bush’ 
reinforces stereotypes that Africa’s marginalised rural land targeted by foreign investors is 
uncultivated, undeveloped, uninhabitable and of no economic value (Borras and Franco 2010). 
Bhupendar Rathore, a senior manager at Mansa, buttressed the imagery of a bush in an 
interview. He said, ‘when we first came, there was nothing here but bush’ (Smith 2017). Some 
local elites such as Chief Rasford Chita also claimed the land was lying dormant for five years 
which, however, was not the case. Even state elites emphasised that there were vacant tracts of 
land in Zambia’s communal areas. For example, the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources 
appealed for more investors in Chembe because of its ‘vast arable land.’ 19 At a global level the 
World Bank also listed Zambia as one of the countries with vacant and underutilised land. 
 
Contrary to the above ideological persuasions of vacant and unutilised land, our empirics 
showed that the land was a source of multiple livelihoods. Central was smallholder agriculture 
on the customary and state land acquired. A total of 168 local farmers used the ‘state land’ to 
produce cassava, maize, groundnuts, beans, sweet potatoes and vegetables before and after it 
was acquired by government for MFEZ in 2009.  Even by the conservative Department of 
Agriculture statistics there were 10, 000 registered farmers eking their livelihoods on customary 
land in Chembe.20 The main crops grown were cassava, maize and beans. Cassava was a local flex 
crop. It was used to make thick porridge, alcohol for drinking after a hard day’s work in the 
fields and the leaves were used for relish.  It was also a herbal remedy meant to enhance fertility. 
Other crops were soya beans (a new crop), rice, groundnuts, bambara nuts and fruits such as 
bananas and oranges for consumption and for sale. Shifting cultivation was a prevalent practice. 




                                                             
19  https://www.znbc.co.zm/50m-mansa-sugar-set-to-open/, 6 February 2018 




Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies: Working Paper Series 12 Dec 2018 
7 Foreign Investments and Livelihoods in Northern Zambia 
However, some neo-classical economists frame ‘vacant’ and ‘underutilised’ land to reflect a 
valuation of productivity rather than wider livelihood uses (Cotula et al 2009), a perspective that 
was popular with most state elites and investors. However, we argue that place-based realities 
become key, for these were long ignored rural farmers. They were resource famished with no 
meaningful state support for inputs, markets for various commodities, credits and infrastructure 
but producing sustainably on the land. The contrast with the massive incentives awarded to the 
new investors in Chembe showed the state’s large-scale bias. For, ‘not all 10 000 government 
registered [small-scale] farmers received state support in the 2017-18 season. Only 3 927 
received government support. This was in the form of seed, fertilisers and chemicals’.21 There 
was general shortage of inputs and the government did not intervene. Chindowe Mulongwe, the 
Crop Officer for the district said, ‘many farmers wanted to grow soya but the seed was not found 
in the district. There were few agro- dealers dealing with soya beans. Farmers want to secure 
soya seed through the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) E-voucher system but there was 
only one agro dealer with 20 bags which catered for a few … it failed because of seed 
shortages’.22 Market support was also absent as farmers complained of lack of reliable markets 
for their commodities and price fluctuations of crops like cassava in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). Nevertheless, smallholder farmers still produced sustainably and the land 
supported rural livelihoods. As an example, we give three vignettes on production from farmers 
who lost their land. 
Farmer A  
 
Bonias Chabala was born in 1955. He used to farm maize, cassava and groundnuts on the 3.2 
hectares of land that was taken by the investor. He produced 70 x 50kg bags of maize, 55 bags of 
cassava and 30-35 bags of groundnuts per season. Out of these his family consumed 10 bags of 
maize per year, seven bags of cassava per year and one bag of groundnuts per year.  For the 
remainder, he sold 60 bags of maize to the government’s Food Reserve Agency (FRA) at K60 per 
bag [UD$1 is equivalent to about K12], about 45 bags of cassava at K110 each to traders in 





Loveness Kalasha was born in 1969.  She used to produce cassava, maize and beans on her two 
hectares of land before it was taken by Mansa Sugar Limited. For maize, she produced 80-120 x 
50 kg bags per hectare per season, 15 x 80 kg bags of cassava per lima [1 lima=0.25 hectares]. 
She and her family of 10, consumed 2 x 50 kg bags of maize per month and 1 x 80 kg bag of 
cassava per month. She sold about 120 bags of maize for K20 per 5 kgs to the Congolese and 
people from Ndola and the Copper belt. She used to sell the maize in DRC before the Zambian 
government banned maize exports. However, the cassava she still sold at Kasumbalesa in the DRC 




Vincent Chola was born in 1958. He used to produce cassava, maize, beans and groundnuts on 
three hectares of cleared land taken by Mansa Sugar Limited. He produced 15 bags of maize per 
lima, eight bags per quarter lima. His family of eight consumed 2 x 50 kgs of maize per month and 
10 baskets of cassava. He sold 25 bags x 50 kgs of maize to the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) and 
10-15 bags x 50kgs of cassava at K150 a bag.25 
 
                                                             
21 Interview, Patrick Bwala, Senior Agricultural Officer, Chembe, 13 March 2018 
22 Interview, Chindowe Mulongwe, Crop Officer, Chembe, 13 March 2018 
23 Interview, Bonias Chabala, Chembe, 16 March 2018 
24  Interview, Loveness, Chembe, March 2018 
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The vignettes further demonstrate that Chembe’s customary lands were not only occupied but 
the modes of production were oriented towards local and regional markets through informal 
and formal channels. It challenges the framing that African rural farmers are substantivists 
operating outside commodity circuits. They cannot be relegated to the pristine agrarian world. 
Rather, these can be conceptualised as petty commodity producers, to borrow from Cousins 
(2010). They are integrated in the market but perhaps use non-commodity relations at times 
(van der Ploeg 2013). The farmers in Chembe used family labour but also hired labour. Mumba 
Nobert, a farmer who was displaced explained, ‘at the time I was farming on my two hectares of 
land, before I was displaced I was contributing to local economic development. I was employing 
labour. People would come to work on my fields in groups of 10 and I would pay them’.  So there 
was economic activity on the land that was acquired by Mansa Sugar Limited supporting wider 
local livelihoods. Following our evidence, we argue that the customary land acquired was living 
capital and far from ‘vacant’ and ‘unutilised’. A key question that follows is, how was this 
productive and inhabited customary land in Chembe acquired? 
 
CUSTOMARY LAND ACQUISITION  
The investor approached the chief in line with Zambia’s 1995 Lands Act and privately negotiated 
for the 2 500 hectares of customary land. Sub-Chief Harrison Mumba recalled, ‘in April 2016, 
Mansa representatives who were Indians came to my palace to ask for 10 000 hectares of land. I 
gave them 2 500 hectares in Kombo area. The land they wanted was too much. It was going to 
affect a lot of people’.26  From the available data, the chief agreed subject to consulting the 
people. When some of the local farmers were consulted by the traditional leaders and the 
investor they gave conditional consent.  First, they wanted the investor to ensure the boundary 
of the farm was 800-1 000 metres from the village.27 This was because they wanted to fetch 
firewood from the forest to cook and use other natural resources to support wider livelihoods. 
Second, they wanted the investor to ‘improve school and health institutions in terms of building 
classrooms, accommodation for teachers and medical personnel in the area’.28 Third, they 
wanted an improvement of the road network. They wanted it to be tarred. Fourth, they wanted 
the investor to install electricity for them. Fifth, they required a ‘network tower for phone 
communication’.29 Sixth, was a demand for employment. They told the investor that, ‘when you 
employ workers we want permanent workers not only casual workers … with reasonable 
salaries and conditions’ for off-farm income to augment traditional on- farm income.30 Seventh, 
they wanted the investor to build houses for the village heads.31 Eighth, they wanted 
compensation of K4 500 per quarter lima [1 lima=0.25 hectares] of cassava. They argued that 
they got 15 bags of cassava from a quarter lima [0.06 hectares] which amounted to the 
requested figure.32 According to community members interviewed the investor agreed to meet 
all these conditions hence ‘consent’ was given. At the meeting the traditional leaders played a 
crucial role in convincing the people to give away their land. It seems the five village headmen at 
the meeting were to gain personal benefits by advancing the interest of the investor. To 
illustrate this the five headmen namely Mofya White, Bonias Chabala, Chola Belt, Power Iwando 
                                                             
26 Interview, Harrison Mumba, Chief, Kapwepwe Village, 13 March 2018 
27 Community meeting minutes, held at Fikombe primary school, 22 April 2016. Started at 1430 hrs and ended 1730hrs. 
Corroborated by various interviews 
28 Community meeting minutes, held at Fikombe primary school, 22 April 2016. Started at 1430 hrs and ended 1730hrs. 
Corroborated by various interviews 
29 Community meeting minutes, held at Fikombe primary school, 22 April 2016. Started at 1430 hrs and ended 1730hrs. 
Corroborated by various interviews 
30 Community meeting minutes, held at Fikombe primary school, 22 April 2016. Started at 1430 hrs and ended 1730hrs. 
Corroborated by various interviews 
31 Community meeting minutes, held at Fikombe primary school, 22 April 2016. Started at 1430 hrs and ended 1730hrs. 
Corroborated by various interviews 
32 Interview, Harrison Mumba, Chief, Kapwepwe Village, 13 March 2018. Corroborated by Community meeting minutes, held 




Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies: Working Paper Series 12 Dec 2018 
9 Foreign Investments and Livelihoods in Northern Zambia 
and Mumba Bushira wrote a letter of consent to the Director of Mansa Sugar after the meeting. 
They raised one demand for personal benefit. As ‘the headmen of this area we discussed and 
accept our investor to start operating in our land as [for] development in the area.  What we 
need [from] our investor is to help the headmen of this area to build their houses. We have done 
a great job to convince people to release their customary land’.33 They engaged in rent seeking 
mechanisms, a phenomenon observed in other land deals in Zambia.  Beyond this thinking was a 
conviction by the community that capitalist ventures could be disciplined. 
 
The district council was supposed to check whether there were any conflicting claims according 
to the law. We could not get confirmation as to whether this was done. What is a fact, is that the 
district council proceeded to make a positive recommendation to the Commissioner of Lands 
who had the ultimate power to convert customary land into state land. Once the Commissioner 
gave the title, Mansa Sugar Limited got a 99-year leasehold from the Ministry of Lands. As stated 
in the 1995 Land Act, the customary land is lost forever once converted, for it cannot be 
converted back into customary land. Fundamental to these transactions is that, ‘customary land 
is seen as a fungible bundle of property rights that can easily be converted, transferred, and 
transformed from user rights in land into private property’ (Amanor 2012:734) in line with neo-
classical framing. This ‘allows the dominant political coalitions at the local level to redefine 
customary tenure in line with their narrow group interests and appropriate the land of the poor 
and marginalised’ (Amanor 2012:734). 
 
Nevertheless, the local authorities (chiefs, state elites and the private investor) argued that there 
was voluntary consent to the acquisition of customary land. This brings into focus the concept of 
FPIC. This is a principle that underpins the widely accepted Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
(VGGT) and the African Union (AU)’s Guiding Principles on Large-scale Land-based Investments. 
However, it was difficult to concur with its applicability and implementability in our case. Once 
some chiefs openly motivated for the release of the land to the investor at the consultative 
community meeting the issue of power relations took centre stage. Chiefs in Zambia are 
powerful because they administer customary land. They have both formal and informal power 
(Brown 2005). In some cases, the chiefs epitomise ‘decentralised despotism’ (Mamdani 1996). It 
was therefore difficult for less powerful community members who disagreed to freely oppose 
the traditional leaders’ position in public. 
   
These realities of the differentiated nature of Chembe society across gender, class, age, ethnicity, 
wealth, etc., make it difficult to authoritatively assert whose consent was to be prioritised. Was it 
to be by majority or by consensus? For example, most female-headed households refused to 
cede their land to the company because it increased the burden of securing livelihoods but the 
investor went on to dispossess them because of the letter of ‘consent’ from the traditional 
leaders. Susan Chenda, born in 1960, lost 11 hectares of her land to Mansa without consent. She 
said, ‘I refused to give away my land. But the company used earth moving equipment to destroy 
my crops. I feel deprived of my right to land. This defeats the purpose why our ancestors fought 
for independence and this is perpetuating poverty.’34 The different actors in Africa’s land deals 
are differently empowered by existing formal and informal institutions (Franco 2014). This 
makes it difficult to neatly apply the principle of FPIC. 
Others gave ‘consent’ under duress, given relentless directives from an investor who had the 
power, networks and resources to advance its own interests. Clementina Chipulu who lost two 
hectares of her land explained, 
 
I was forced to give them the land but had said no. When the investor came I said no. I refused. 
After one week they came back and I refused. The meeting did not yield any fruits. The third time 
the investor came and demanded that I give away the land. It was now difficult to resist. The 
                                                             
33 Letter to Investor, 22 April 2016 
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investor pestered me and put me under pressure. I said, “I do not want to give you my land, it is 
my birth right. I will die.” I did not want to give away my land. I was made to understand that land 
had already been taken. The Chief told us that it was a government decision so we had to give 
away our land. They used deception. 35 
 
We had no doubt from our study that state officials in Chembe had an investor bias.  Albert 
Mwewa, one of the affected farmers, said, ‘Government must be fair and sincere because we 
elected them into office. They must work for the people who put them into office and not the 
investor’. 36 
 
Harrison Mumba, the sub-chief for Kapwepwe further explained,  
Government must consult before investors come. It helps to know the community interest. There 
is no effort from the District Commissioner to explain his role. The DC is a new position because 
we are a new district. Because there is no dialogue, communities think government is for the 
investors and not for them. Government must explain to people. Now chiefs face problems to 
explain to the people. The burden is left on us chiefs.  37 
 
In addition to government bias, what also comes out clearly from the above is that there was 
inadequate information provided during the consultation. This was further collaborated by Mr 
Kalaba, Mansa Land Alliance Coordinator who said, ‘at a follow up meeting held on 11 
September 2017 at the Provincial Administration office, no one could provide evidence of 
consultation that took place. The investor, the chiefs and local government officials had no 
documentation to prove that the consultation process happened... information was not made 
available to the community’.38 Even Mansa Land Alliance, a powerful civil society organisation in 
the district, had no access to information. The broader community was not even granted access 
to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).  Local realities also showed that there was no 
chance for a legal challenge. Even if it was there, the income-poor farmers could not afford the 
legal costs against the well-resourced investors. Beyond the loss of land as natural capital, what 
else was lost? 
 
BEYOND LOSS OF LAND RIGHTS 
A major concern was the reduction in crop production due to the decreased cultivation area for 
affected households. The land acquisition worsened the situation of food availability for poor 
rural households in Chembe. To illustrate, Irene Mwape from Chitala village lost her land to 
Mansa Sugar Limited. She was 43 years old. She had eight children – five boys and three girls. 
She suffered a loss of income, was now forced to buy food at the market and consequently her 
family had become food insecure. She reflected,  
 
I used to farm maize, cassava, groundnuts and beans. Out of the crops I harvested, I would get K1 
000 for maize, K900 for cassava, beans K800 and groundnuts about K500. Now there is nowhere 
to grow crops because my piece of land was taken. I have to survive on a paltry wage of K300 
including buying food. I have to buy maize and cassava from members of the community who still 
have their fields. A gallon of maize is K5 and a bag of cassava is K100. A bag of cassava lasts for 
about a month if mixed with maize and I need five gallons of maize a month.  We are now food 
insecure because we rely on buying. In comparison to when we had our land there is a big 
difference in terms of what we eat. All food crops came from the field. In the past, with six 
hectares of land we could eat food anytime and we did not measure portions. Normally, we would 
eat three times a day. Now it is difficult to eat as we please. We now eat twice a day – in the 
                                                             
35 Interview, Clementina Chipulu, Chembe, 15 March 2018 
36 Interview, Mwewa Kaluba, Chembe,17 March 2018 
37 Interview, Harrison Mumba, Kapwepwe village, 13 March 2018 
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afternoon and in the evening. At lunch we have maize and in the evening shima and vegetables or 
dried fish when we can afford to buy it.39 
 
This phenomenon has been observed in land deals that result in local farmers losing their land in 
Zambia (Joala et al 2016). The outcome is in contradistinction with most international guidelines 
whose sum total is mainly meant to secure and promote food security. Even the World Bank’s 
much criticised Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, 
Livelihoods and Resources (PRAI) are clear on this goal. The second PRAI principle emphasises 
that investments should not jeopardise food security but rather strengthen it. It is explicit in 
that, ‘whenever there are potential adverse effects on any aspect of food security (availability, 
access, utilisation or stability), policy-makers should make provisions for the local or directly 
affected populations so that they do not become food insecure (FAO et al 2009:7). In Chembe, no 
provisions were made as the poor were left to sink on their own. 
 
Household rural poverty also increased as a result of the financial incomes of certain affected 
families falling after the loss of their land. This affected households’ regular inflow of capital. For 
example, Edward Chilufya from Saki village lost his land to Mansa Sugar. 
  
There is a big difference in my income. In the past I had 4 hectares of land. I was able to sell 80 
bags of cassava to the Congo. One bag was K300. I now have no field to make an income. I would 
sell maize to the Food Reserve Agency. I harvested 300 bags last season and got paid. This income 
alleviated family problems but now I have nowhere to grow and have to rely on paltry wages 
from Mansa Sugar Limited. Mansa Sugar is like a thief that came to steal from us. Does this mean 
we are going forward as a nation? 40 
 
The loss of financial capital had an adverse effect on acquiring human capital, especially 
education. Other local farmers were now struggling to keep their children at school. Beatrice 
Mwale from Mumbwe village who lost her land explained,  
 
I have children in school. One is in grade seven at Kasama school; another is in grade 11 at 
Fikombo school. I also have another child at Mpkia Agricultural College. I used to support them 
from the 11 hectares of land that I had. Now I can no longer afford it. I am no longer able to 
support my children in terms of school fees.41 
 
An increase in education can make one get a good job and more money to invest in the fields. In 
this case, sending children to school also acted as a social safety net in future. 
There is a danger for academics to reduce land to its productive elements and merely view it as a 
commodity (de Schutter 2011). Investors did not merely acquire land, water and affected the 
economic status of local people. In our case study, access to land guaranteed healthier 
livelihoods for the rural farmers. Land with traditional medicines was acquired and people lost 
access. From our study, they lost access to 21 different kinds of medicinal herbs that were used 
to treat various diseases that afflicted the local community. These herbs were on the land 
acquired by the investor and in surrounding areas. A similar trend was observed by Joala et al 
(2016) in Kalumbila and Mumbwa. The herbs in Chembe were used to treat headaches, coughs, 
dysentery, stomach pains, fits, diarrhoea, prolonged monthly periods in women, eye problems, 
infertility, sexually transmitted diseases and sores. The investor destroyed a people’s well 
stocked ‘pharmacy’, thereby compromising their health.  
The following table is a collation of the herbs that were lost. It is based on our interviews and 
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Table 2: Traditional medicinal herbs lost 
Number Name of Herb Major Use 
1 Indale To treat headaches 
2 Ichifumbe To cure coughs 
3 Mabele To cure dysentery 
4 Kalai For pain relief 
5 Umunosokansoka To treat stomach aches 
6 Katenge To cure fits 
7 Umsalya For diarrhoea 
8 Akafifi For eye treatment 
9 Makukwe To cure prolonged monthly periods in 
women 
10 Umpundu For serious headaches 
11 Kalai For serious headaches 
12 Lunda To cure stomach upsets 
13 Umupoto To cure toothache 
14 Papwe To treat children with persistent stomach 
pains  
15 Umupyanga Mansa To cure infertility 
16 Umulama To treat sexually transmitted diseases 
17 Mulberry To treat sexually transmitted diseases 
18 Isase To treat sores, wounds and cuts 
19 Imisoko To treat diarrhoea in children 
20 Linda To treat stomach upsets 
21 Umutondo To treat sores 
 
This is part of the human benefits from the land, not adequately captured by a narrow macro-
economic approach. These benefits are ignored in simplifications to fit the mainstream 
understanding of productive lands (Borras and Franco 2010b). Local people were now much 
more vulnerable to poor health. Good health as a human capital is a means to earning other 
livelihood capital. It has intrinsic value.  
Another negative impact never adequately captured by macro-economic imperatives is 
perpetual psychological torture caused by tenure uncertainty. Communities lived in fear. They 
believed that the investor was going to take their remaining customary land. That was because 
the investors still wanted to acquire 5 000 more hectares.  As stated earlier, in the initial stages 
Mansa Sugar had asked for 10 000 hectares. The investor said they needed more land because 
part of the land they acquired was swampy.  In addition, community members felt that the 
investor did not respect the boundary and kept encroaching into their land. Mumba Nobert, a 
displaced farmer captured the development, said, ‘we are living in fear every day. The company 
will expand into our land. There was a boundary set. However, Mansa Sugar is planting pine 
trees beyond their boundary. They are encroaching into our customary land. It is like we are 
surrounded by lions’.42 A similar trend was observed in Mkushi by Nolte (2013) and in 
Kalumbila by Joala et al (2016). Nolte (2013) observed that investors who 
were initially allocated state land and farming blocks later 
migrated from the state land to customary land in Mkushi. Across Zambia there was fear, 
uncertainty and anxiety that caused deep stress among the communities that co-existed with the 
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investors. It is difficult to quantify the financial cost of psychological torture as we move to 
analyse the compensation process. 
 
NARROW COMPENSATION 
I am inclined to agree with Wily (2012) that the focus of investors is to capture the land cheaply 
and legally. The compensation given by Mansa Sugar Limited did not consider the diverse and 
multiple livelihoods sourced on the land. As mentioned earlier, the farmers produced a variety of 
crops in the fields that were taken by Mansa Sugar Limited. However, out of the diverse crops 
that included cassava, maize, groundnuts, etc., Mansa only agreed to compensate for cassava. 
Abel Chisanga from Mumbwe village who lost his land and received compensation, elaborated, 
‘Mansa only compensated for cassava fields. Maize and beans were not factored in. They argued 
that cassava was a long term crop as it took up to three years to harvest and that maize was a 
short term crop.  Mansa Sugar Limited said no compensation for my maize and beans because 
they were for only one season’.43 The investor did not only refuse to compensate short term 
crops but destroyed the crops. This is despite the fact that the community had ‘agreed with the 
company for a two to three years grace period so that farmers could harvest their crops’ 44 which 
were key to their livelihoods. The investor eventually did not respect the agreement. As a result, 
local farmers lost their maize, groundnuts and beans. Jennifer Lukole from Chipanda village 
lamented, ‘the company came to destroy my crops with excavators. I wanted to sell the crops. I 
had cassava fields to be harvested in April 2018. Groundnuts were destroyed and my maize crop 
was destroyed in January 2017 a few months before harvesting. That was cruel’.45 The crops 
destroyed constituted the staple food for the whole year in most households and they ensured 
that survival was not at stake whilst waiting for the long term crops.  
 
All the farmers we interviewed said the compensation was not enough as depicted in the three 
cases below. 
Case A. 
‘The amount of compensation was not enough. They [investors] did not meet the promise. We had 
agreed quarter lima was K4 500 but the company did not consider it. At first I refused the money 
because we did not agree. There was a second meeting and we agreed. We were paid in cash in 
February 2016. The money is finished. We paid school fees and bought fertilisers. For my two 
hectares of land I wanted K70 000 as compensation. Something must be done.’ 46 
Case B. 
Angie Mwewa who was 42 years old and lost 8 hectares of land was not happy with the 
compensation. She was born in Chembe. Angie said, ‘they came with the police to force us to 
accept the little compensation. They told us that we would walk out with nothing if we resisted… 
The initial agreement was that quarter lima was supposed to be K4 500. I only got K4 500 despite 
the initial agreement indicating otherwise. My rights to land have been violated… My plea is that 
those investors must give us compensation as we initially agreed. I cannot call this development 
when life is going backwards instead of forward’.47 
Case C. 
Albert Katele who lost 10 hectares of land to the investor complained, ‘the compensation was 
little. I had 10 hectares of land and I got K7 500. I complained bitterly but I was asked to move out 
of the room [room 7 at Fikombo primary school] where compensation was being paid in cash] by 
the police. They did not want me to speak. I went to council and I was promised more but nothing 
has happened yet’.48 
                                                             
43 Interview, Abel Chisanga, Chembe, 17 March 2018 
44 Interview, Noah Katebe, Chembe, 17 March 2018 
45 Interview, Jennifer Lukole, Chembe, 17 March 2018 
46 Interview, Mumba Nobert, 14 March 2018 
47 Interview, Angie Mwewa, Chembe, 16 March 2018 
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All the people we interviewed who were compensated had already used up the money they 
received but still had livelihoods to support. The next table collated from our primary data, 
shows how compensation was paltry for the hectares that had cassava crops. Zambian law does 
not consider compensation for customary land in ‘voluntary’ acquisition.  If it were state land, 
the locals could have been compensated for the land. 
 
Table 3: Compensation in Chembe District  
Name Amount of land lost in 
hectares 
Amount of compensation 
received  (for cassava on 
the land) 
Vincent Chola  5 K8 000 
Mumba Nobert 2 K16 000 
Mofya White 10 K8 000 
Dickson Chola  15 K15 000 
Bonias Chabala  4 K8 000 
Diana Mpupe 1 K3 000 
Angie Mwewa 8 K4 500 
Clementina Chipula  2 K4 500 
Susan Chenda 11 K4 500 
Mega Sakeni  2 K6 825 
Albert Katele 10 K7 500 
Jeniffer Lubole  5 K4 000 
Mwea Kaluba 30 K11 000 
 
The money they were given was not enough to sustain their livelihoods and for argument’s sake, 
buy available alternative state land which, ironically, was converted from customary land. From 
our survey the cost of state land in the new council plots was as depicted below. 
 
Table 4: Cost of Possible Alternative Land 
Type Size Cost 
High Cost 40m x 60m K7 500 
Medium Cost 30m x 40m K5 000 
Low Cost 18m x 30m K3 000 
 
This means very few households could afford the land once converted to state land and put on 
the free market in line with Zambia’s neo-liberal public policy. 
 
The dispossessed local farmers had initially agreed with the company to be paid K4 500 per 
quarter lima of cassava as monetary compensation at a consultative meeting that included most 
of the affected villagers. However, after the inclusive community meeting there was another 
‘exclusive’ meeting held on 21 January 2017 at Chembe Council Chambers. It was attended by 
relevant governmental departments, 12 community representatives and the investor. It was at 
this meeting that the company Director changed his decision and rejected to pay the 
compensation figure of K4 500 with the support of government officials.49 Harrison Mumba, the 
sub-Chief was clear that the compensation figure was set unilaterally. This reflected the skewed 
power relations. He explained, ‘people continue to complain about compensation because the 
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decision was determined by the company and the government without them. There was no 
consultation on compensation. It was unilateral decision making…There was no information on 
the evaluation criteria. It is unfair…We need input from stakeholders’.50 From the second 
meeting it was clear that the compensation was determined by government rates not 
understood by the community that worked on the land. However, according to a committee 
member the ‘new price was taken to the community by committee members and the community 
accepted this price per quota lima’.51 From our study, other community members begrudgingly 
agreed to receive the new compensation figure set by a few powerful elites. To them it seemed 
there was no option. Some were lured by the prospect of receiving lump sum payments given 
the increased monetisation of the local economy. With little financial literacy the value of the 
money in replacing livelihoods was not factored by this group.  
 Mr Kalaba, the provincial coordinator of Mansa Land Alliance explained, 
 
Internationally there are guidelines and principles but communities once they see money they get 
excitable. They forget they need to understand the benefits and engage. They realised after 
spending that the money was not enough. We need to help people to understand fully before 
anything is done. ... Luapula province is the most poverty stricken. So money causes anxiety. 
Poverty and low levels of education affect people’s understanding on what the law says.    
 
Others did not receive the new information and still believed in the open old agreement of 
K4 500 per quarter lima. 
 
Compensation was narrowly conceptualised that local farmers who practiced ‘chitemene’ (that 
is shifting cultivation) were not paid anything. The land was misconstrued as the ‘bush’ where 
there was ‘nothing’. In addition, unplanted fields at the time of land acquisition were not 
compensated whether they were un-cleared or cleared.  Mwewa Kaluba said, ‘I had 30 hectares 
of land. I cleared eight hectares of those. For compensation I got only K11 000 for cleared land. 
The company did not consider the amount of land I had but only those fields where there was 
cassava. This means my land was taken for nothing. I am single and not married’. 52 One could 
argue that customary land did not legally qualify for compensation in the unjust Zambian law 
but what about the labour used to clear the fields which were not compensated.  Even one of the 
local Chiefs, Harrison Mumba, complained, ‘the investor did not consider the amount of 
investment we had put into clearing the fields. The labour we spent to cultivate was not factored 
in. Even our time was not compensated’.53 On the other hand, the government officials were 
dismissive of further claims for compensation by community members. According to the Council 
Secretary there ‘was no more compensation to be paid. As government it is unfair on the 
investors to keep compensating. No more compensation. They already signed. Even people from 
outside the community are mobilising for compensation’.54 
 
It is clear that the compensation process did not meet international best practice as enshrined in 
the VGGT and AU guidelines that seek to support wider livelihoods. As Dalal-Clayton and Sadler 
(2014:297) have argued, compensation must be paid for ‘loss of assets or access to assets; or 
loss of income sources or means of livelihood, whether or not the affected persons must move to 
another location’. This is an approach that is in sync with our wider livelihoods perspective. Yet 
in this case, not even all crops and trees were compensated. The livelihoods of the farmers were 
at least supposed to be restored to previous levels as per various progressive international 
guidelines but not even a valuation of that was done. Perhaps, corporate agribusiness cannot be 
expected to act on the basis of voluntary guidelines. This presents a challenge to proponents of 
co-existence regulated by the principles. To borrow from White et al (2013), ‘capitalist firms are 
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not boy scouts and are unlikely to place moral codes and good governance above profit and 
needs of shareholders’. The community did not only lose land but wider livelihoods that were 
not compensated. Despite the gloomy picture, the question arises if there were any benefits 
derived for the local farmers? 
 
BENEFITING LOCAL LIVELIHOODS? 
We acknowledge that the investor created jobs, occupied by some of the displaced farmers. 
However, these were mainly casual and precarious jobs. To make matters worse, the investor 
failed to pay the casual workers their salaries from January to March 2018, creating a local crisis 
of livelihoods. Even when the investor could pay in 2017, the new wages could not sustain 
livelihoods as salaries were low. Thus not all jobs that come with the new investors are 
emancipatory. As in many land deal cases across Africa, the promise of decent jobs is proving 
elusive. We are inclined to agree with Wily (2012:775) that ‘one is reminded that even the much 
more expansive industrialisation of the nineteenth century enclosures could not produce the 
number of jobs required and more often than not meant the poorhouse for the most 
disadvantaged and poor’.55 All the general workers that we interviewed complained about poor 
working conditions and salaries, as the cases below depict. 
 
Mwewa Margret Case 
 
Mwewa Margret was a casual worker at Mansa Sugar. She lost her land. She complained of the 
working conditions, ‘in a day we must weed or plant 800 metres. This is a task difficult to 
complete. Each time we want to complain, they say if you are not interested, you can leave. I am 
now in the third month without pay. I started working there in January 2018. I do weeding, 
loading of logs in a truck and planting sugar-cane.’56 
 
Patrick Chibale Case  
 
Patrick Chibale from Mumbwa village explained, ‘I started to work for Mansa Sugar in December 
2017. I got paid K200. I was doing general work like weeding. I started from 0600hrs to 1800hrs 
working without lunch. We had no gloves, no gumboots. But when an Indian supervisor came 
s/he will be wearing gumboots and gloves. The working environment was not good. We 
encountered snakes in the fields at times. What kind of investment brings snakes? From January 
2018 I was not paid, so I left.’57 
 
Irene Mwape Case 
 
‘I started working in May 2017 as a general worker. I clear the land, do weeding, remove any 
other materials before the planting of sugar-cane. The job that I do am not happy with, but there 
is nothing I can do since all the land is taken from me. I prefer to work on my own piece of land 
because the working conditions and the money is not good… I still work on my own field but it 
belongs to Mansa Sugar Limited now. I am not happy.’58 
 
Irene still identified with the acquired land and calls it her ‘own’. This shows an intrinsic strong 
claim to land rights.  
 
The General Manager complained, ‘getting workforce is now difficult. People have their land and 
are growing their things. The rain season is therefore difficult to get labourers. More women 
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come to work during winter’59. That was because most women worked in their remaining fields 
during summer. After harvest they then sought wage-labour, signifying the hoe-wage 
relationship and defying full proletarianisation nor de-peasantisation associated with the 
transition path. This is a long established historical fact in Southern Africa. 
 
It is important to mention here that there were differential benefits from employment. There are 
a few who got long-term contracts for clerical jobs. These increased their financial ‘capital’. 
However, those few now stayed in company houses in the enclosure. In addition to some 
employment, the community benefited from skills development. The General Manager 
explained, ‘we are training them. We give 5-10 days training on irrigation, how to plant and 
many other things. The good ones become supervisors’.60 The investor also gave mattresses and 
pillows to the local clinic and some roofing materials to schools as part of social corporate 
responsibility. These seemed welfarist and not emancipatory enough for poverty reduction. 
What then should the future look like? 
 
CONTESTED AGRARIAN FUTURES 
In order to structure our final analysis on the contested futures, we recast de Schutter’s (2011) 
trifocal approach with examples from the field in Chembe.  The transitional path was mainly 
preferred by investors, state elites and some western journalists. They articulated a future of 
highly capitalised industrial farming in the countryside, a situation whereby investors would 
acquire more rural land used by smallholder farmers and establish ‘more profitable’ large-scale 
capitalist ventures. From their narrow perspective, such an industrialisation process would wipe 
away smallholder farmers through de-peasantisation with rural proletarianisation taking place. 
For them, smallholder farmers had no future as Chembe was said to be ‘heading towards 
industrial farming in ten years’.61 Such insular modernisation narratives were not only 
ahistorical but ignored the fact that the small-scale farmers were the largest producers of food 
crops such as maize and cassava, not only in Chembe but in Zambia more broadly. Proponents of 
the transitional pathways also ignored credible evidence from elsewhere that shows that 
smallholder production is effective in reducing poverty (Wiggins et al 2010).    
 
Most male respondents preferred the investor to remain in Chembe and honour its promises 
and obligations. For example, Albert Mwewa said, ‘let Mansa Sugar Limited continue and stick to 
the compensation we agreed’.62 John Kalaba from Chital village also concurred, ‘let Mansa Sugar 
continue for they have put in a lot of money. All we need is fair compensation’.63 Mulenga Mwape 
from Chitale village explained, ‘I am appealing to Mansa to promote fairness. Compensation and 
fair labour practices, that is what we want as a people. We want to work properly with them but 
they must be fair with us’.64  It seemed men wanted the money because they controlled the 
distribution of household income. 
 
This was a difficult proposition though. The investor and local state elites unequivocally claimed 
that enough compensation had been paid. In the absence of a massive social uprising and a 
strong legal case backed by alternative valuation of wider livelihoods, this was difficult to 
realise. More broadly and beyond, one wonders whether the investors will be bound by regional 
and global regulations for responsible investments that produce a win-win situation in the 
context of weak governance and unequal power relations. 
                                                             
59 Interview, Mansa General Manager, Chembe, 12 March 2018 
60 Interview, Mansa General Manager, Chembe, 12 March 2018 
61 Interview, Tyson Kalaba, Mansa District Land Alliance, Mansa office, 18 March 2018 
62 Interview, Albert Mwewa, Chembe, 15 March 2018 
63 Interview, John Kalaba, Chembe, 12 March 2018 
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The alternative path was reflected more by women and poorer households who wanted the 
investor to exit Chembe and give them back their land. This is because women work the land 
more and are major providers of food and income to the family. There is a corpus of literature 
that shows that women in Africa work the land more than men. Narrow models based on 
monetary compensation disadvantaged women because in most cases men controlled the 
money and women lost their fields and wider livelihoods. Therefore, it was not surprising that 
women valued a piece of land more than men. To illustrate this, Irene Mwape said, ‘I prefer the 
investor to go back and give us back our land because our lifestyle is now different than in the 
past’.65 Albina Chilufya said, ‘since the investor has violated the agreement, I do not think they 
can continue, I think they can pack and go’.66 Beatrice Mwale, another woman who lost her land, 
was of the same opinion, ‘my view is that this company must just give us our land back. They 
failed to honour the agreement so they must go back. I prefer to work on my land because it has 
more value’.67 
 
The demand for investor exit was understandably meant to reclaim and protect the land, which 
was the primary livelihood capital for most households in Chembe. However, given the 
intersection of the state, traditional leaders and investor interests culminating into hierarchical 
coercive power relations, Mansa Sugar Limited was likely to stay for the foreseeable future. 
Hence the need to think beyond a ‘chase them away’ approach. The immediate priority is for the 
state to give the local farmers who lost their land some alternative land that will ensure they 
have secure livelihoods. That must be followed by a moratorium to stop further acquisition of 
customary land in Chembe whilst options for emancipatory investment models are being 
worked out. The future will mean that foreign investors and the state will support local farmers 
without taking away their land and land rights. As de Schutter (2011:262) argued, ‘small-scale 
farmers can be helped by investments upstream and downstream in the production process 
itself, focusing on the provision of public goods that can improve productivity and access to 
markets, and on institutional innovations that can strengthen the position of small-scale farmers 
and allow them to obtain a better revenue for their produce’. Perhaps the state should also 
consider strengthening local production systems through non-exploitative outgrower schemes 
or contract farming. Of course, outgrower schemes have worked in some cases and failed in 
others across Africa, as illustrated by Scoones (2016). It will depend on the model, relations of 
investor, state and the outgrowers as well the political and economic context. This is not to say 
everyone will win because local processes of social differentiation will lead to winners and 




In conclusion, the evidence generated from this study renews the academic debate, for it 
challenges critical assumptions about the nature, inclusivity and impact of land-based large-
scale investments in rural Africa using a wider livelihoods approach. We argued that the land 
acquired by Mansa Sugar Limited was neither vacant nor economically unproductive. This land 
was living capital. What was misconstrued as a ‘bush’ by investors, was land meant for diverse 
smallholder production. We also showed that consent to have one’s land taken was conditional 
in a situation where power relations were uneven. It was not a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ situation. Local 
farmers lost land, water resources, financial income, traditional medicinal plants and suffered 
perpetual psychological torture due to tenure uncertainty. All this disrupted the local farmers’ 
day-to-day livelihoods. On the other hand, Mansa Sugar provided some materials for local 
schools and clinics. Jobs were created with some differential benefits and offered to the local 
                                                             
65 Interview, Irene Mwape, Chembe, 15 March 2018 
66 Interview, Albina Chilufya, Saki village, 17 March 2018 
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community. However, the seasonal jobs were largely precarious and failed to sustain local 
livelihoods. Foreign investments that involve loss of land by local communities tend to have 
more disadvantages than benefits. The valuation of what is lost must not be narrow but include 
wider local livelihoods. Alternative models that support smallholder production for poverty 
reduction and development must therefore be pursued. These must transcend the narrow 
transitional path and regulated co-existence which largely undermine livelihoods of African 
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